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U.S. Needs Civilian Guidance on Strategic Policy

WASHINGTON—The intermission in the hearings which the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee is conducting about the controversy in the military establishment gives the American public almost three months to persuade Congress that new action is needed to reconstruct our weakened defense forces.

The first round of the hearings, which ended on October 22, performed the useful service of acquainting the public with the existence of the conflict over strategy which divides the Navy and the Air Force. While the dramatic exposure of disunity disturbed our North Atlantic pact partners, the continuation of the conflict in the privacy of the Department of Defense and its Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee might have resulted eventually in truly serious damage to the United States and our allies in the event this country had to send its military forces into action.

President Truman's announcement on October 27 that Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, a strong advocate of the Navy's case before the Congressional committee, had been relieved as Chief of Naval Operations makes possible an improvement in personal relations among members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it does not go to the roots of the problem which precipitated the controversy. As before, the Navy and the Air Force are apprehensive that each aims to limit the function of the other. As before, the country lacks clear understanding about the kind of flexible force we should maintain in order to adjust ourselves readily and successfully to whatever strategic pattern might emerge should a war start. The Armed Services

Committee can make a genuine contribution when it resumes its hearings in January by deciding how the roots of the problem of interservice mistrust can be removed.

Problems of Unity

The lesson to be drawn so far from the hearings is that the laws for unification of the armed forces passed in 1947 and last summer have not provided the country with adequate machinery for overcoming disagreement among the three major combat branches of the defense establishment. The assumption that the Army, Navy and Air Force, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would not only resolve their differences but would together formulate a national strategic plan—for which they would define the functions of each service along lines permanently acceptable to all—has proved over-optimistic. The Joint Chiefs have become instead an agency for recording disagreement between the Navy on the one hand and the Army and Air Force on the other.

The revised law of 1949 intensified the Navy's sense of isolation by creating the office of chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a post assigned to General Omar N. Bradley at a time when the Army was disputing the Navy's claim to paramountcy in amphibious operations. While General Bradley, who is also the chairman of the military committee of the North Atlantic pact powers, has become celebrated in Washington for good judgment, he allowed himself to display irritation when he revealed his disagreement with the Navy in testimony to the committee on October 20.

By refusing to give the chairman of the Joint Chiefs the authority to decide disputes among the services and by requiring that the Chiefs reach their own agreements only by unanimous ballot, Congress, in enacting the "unification" laws, apparently hoped to save any one service from the possibility of having its planning done by the other services. Yet the law empowers the Secretary of Defense to plan for any single service in a negative sense by depriving the service of the use of funds appropriated by Congress. The Secretary is in effect the disbursing executive for all the military services. The willingness of Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson to curtail naval expenditures has confirmed the Navy's belief that it stands alone as a misunderstood minority in the military establishment. The conviction that it could not achieve its objectives in the Department of Defense precipitated the Navy's decision to pursue the irregular course of registering its complaint publicly with the Congressional committee and through the press.

Uncertainty over Future

The record of the Congressional hearings gives the impression that uncertainty about the future conduct of the other services—not their present relationship—is what disturbs the Navy and the Air Force. The definitions of the functions of the three services as set forth in the Military Establishment Law of 1947 and President Truman's executive order of July 26, 1947, as restated in agreements among the military services in March and August 1948, still prevail, Secretary John-

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son said on October 28. These definitions assigned to the Air Force exclusive authority to carry out strategic air attacks against the economic sources of an enemy's power, and they gave the Navy an important aerial task over the seas. Yet the Air Force has protested that the Navy, not content with this function, has demanded a share in strategic operations. The central theme of the Navy in its complaint to the Congressional committee was that the Air Force has chosen a weak weapon in the B-36 bomber as its main instrument. It also protested the decision to suspend construction of the 80,000-ton plane carrier. The Navy counted mainly on the carrier to fulfill its defined function. Lack of confidence on the part of the services that the definitions which were accepted in 1947 and 1948 have stabilized their separate functions has only accentuated the disagreement which has been growing among Army, Navy and Air Force since Congress in August amended the unification act.

Strategy Study Needed

Basically more important than such technical issues as the usefulness of the B-36 to perform its allotted task is the question that emerges from the hearings whether the United States is wise to rely wholly on military men to design its strategic plans. Air Force General Hoyt S. Vandenberg explained his vote against the new carrier because such a vessel would have little value in a war against America's "one possible enemy." Generals in control of strategic planning in France before 1940 assumed that only weapons of defense would have value against what was then their "one possible enemy" — Germany — and events proved them wrong. The United States, if it were to adopt a single formula of military development, might possibly discover in time of crisis that it had followed an inappropriate policy and then lacked time to correct its errors before succumbing to the enemy. In a temperate statement General Dwight D. Eisenhower,

former Army Chief of Staff, recommended on October 20 that the Joint Chiefs work out their strategic planning in cooperation with the House Armed Services Committee.

President Truman has had civilian boards study the modern roles of the air force and ground forces, but no civilian group has had an opportunity to reach basic conclusions about the related roles of the three separate forces. Such a group would be in a position to conduct its investigations in relative aloofness from the heat of rivalry which may distort the strategic conceptions of the individual services. A civilian study, carried on for the President with military counsel, might not only guide the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. It could also illuminate the question whether we are spending too much, or too little, on preparations against a war that we presumably want to avoid and disclose whether or not our military policy is really synchronized with our foreign policy.

BLAIR BOLLES

How Far Should UN Intervene in Domestic Issues?

Now that the United Nations General Assembly has reached its mid-point, some tentative conclusions can be reached about its fourth session. The atmosphere of optimism and confidence which pervaded the opening days of the session was discounted by some observers whose more gloomy outlook was reinforced by President Truman's announcement on September 23 of a Soviet atomic explosion.

Under the energetic leadership of President Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines however, the Assembly tackled approximately 70 items on its agenda and, at the end of six weeks, in 17 plenary sessions and 253 other meetings had completed action on 22 items. Despite the usual verbal battles between the Eastern and Western blocs—aggravated by the "little cold war" between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union—a number of significant and hopeful trends have emerged as the Assembly progressed.

Asia's New Role

One of these was the more conspicuous participation of Asian and newly independent countries of other areas in the deliberations of the UN, dramatized by the selection of the Philippine leader, General Romulo, as Assembly President.

Seven countries which achieved their independence in the post-war period are already members of the UN: India, Pakistan, Burma, the Philippines, Israel, Syria and the Lebanon. Others, including Ceylon, Nepal, Korea, Jordan and the Mongolian People's Republic are currently applying for admission, and the imminence of independence for Libya and Indonesia means that they, too, will shortly be petitioning for membership.

Among these new states there has been considerable sentiment in favor of using their voting power to form a "third camp." Thus Syria's delegate, Fayez el-Houri Bey, in the opening debate of the General Assembly, asserted that the consolidation of "two camps" would not have occurred if the small states had refused to follow the guidance of the United States or the U.S.S.R.

The potentialities of independent voting became apparent on October 14 when, in the Assembly's Trusteeship Committee, a resolution asking the trustee countries to submit reports on progress toward self-government in their trust territories was passed 24 to 10, against the opposition of the major Western powers. Moreover, the inability of the Assembly to agree on the disposition of the former Italian colonies reflected differences out-

side the Soviet bloc, in which the Latin American and Arab-Asian states were able to cast the decisive votes.

Emphasis on Economics

Another notable feature of the current Assembly session is the growing emphasis on social and economic problems, highlighted by the proposals of the Economic and Social Council for assistance to underdeveloped countries, in line with President Truman's Point Four proposals. The detailed report of the UN Mission to Haiti, published on September 19, provided an example of expert assistance. Spokesmen for the non-industrialized members, however, stressed that technical advice alone did not insure the increase in production and general welfare which everyone is seeking. In particular, while showing enthusiasm over the potentialities of international aid, they expressed concern lest development programs be used as an entering wedge for intervention by the great powers.

The United States, for its part, emphasized that assistance should only be given in cases where it was specifically requested, and then only on terms acceptable to the recipients. The interdependence of political and economic forces, however, may make this goal difficult to

achieve. Thus the UN Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East faces a situation where regional development projects, the future of the Arab refugees and the Palestine question—to say nothing of fundamental domestic problems such as land tenure and water rights—are all closely intertwined.

When Is an Issue Domestic?

The problem of intervention has, accordingly, become one of the most perplexing dilemmas confronting the United Nations. Both the Netherlands and the Union of South Africa have protested against discussions concerning Indonesia and South Africa's Indian minority on the ground that these were domestic issues, not subject to UN jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 2(7) of the Charter which bans such intervention. In the current session the Soviet Union has raised the same objection to the American-sponsored plan for atomic

weapon control and to any UN action on charges that Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria were violating religious and political freedoms, thus disregarding the obligations undertaken in their peace treaties. Nevertheless, the Assembly on October 22 voted 47 to 5 its "increased concern" over the latter issue and asked the International Court of Justice for an opinion on enforcement procedures.

Yugoslavia drew attention to the inconsistency between Russia's protestations favoring "non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries" and its actual policies, such as the current Soviet campaign against the government of Marshal Tito. Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslav Foreign Minister, declared that if the right of every state to self-determination were respected, there would be no danger of war, the chief cause of which, he said, lies in intervention rather than in the simultaneous existence of different social systems. The United States faces the same dilemma

at this very time when it is urging the Marshall Plan countries to reduce mutual trade barriers—an objective forcefully expressed by ECA administrator Paul G. Hoffman before the OEEC in Paris on October 31.

It has become apparent that a growing number of questions which were formerly considered matters of exclusively domestic concern—from the distribution of narcotics to the production of atomic energy, from the treatment of minorities to the protection of industry and agriculture—now gravely affect the welfare of the world and accordingly become subjects for international action. The United Nations, therefore, will find itself increasingly forced to deal with internal questions while at the same time it is obligated to respect the sovereignty of its members.

FRED W. RIGGS

(The first of two articles on the current session of the General Assembly.)

Titoism Adds Third Dimension to Ideological Strife

While Western European socialism strives in diverse ways to achieve economic reconstruction with greater social justice and, at the same time, preserve individual liberties, communism also faces new problems never anticipated by its founders. Paramount among these problems is the impact on communism of nationalism, which prevents creation of an international movement of the working class. Marx and Engels, Lenin and Trotzky had expected such a movement to serve as the lever of a world revolution that would ultimately bring into being all over the globe a classless society free from "exploitation" and "imperialism."

Rise of National Communism

In the 1920's, however, Communist setbacks in Germany, Italy, Eastern Europe and China made it apparent that the expected triumph of world revolution had proved to be a false dawn. The helm in Moscow was then taken by Stalin, who can be described as a nationalist and even as an isolationist when compared with Trotzky, advocate of "permanent world revolution." Following his expulsion of Trotzky in 1927, Stalin proclaimed that Russia was turning from world revolution to the "building of socialism in one country." With the Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941, the "one country" policy developed into all-out emphasis on

Russia's struggle for survival as a nation and on fulfillment, after victory, of the national aspirations pursued before the Bolshevik revolution by Russian Tsars from Ivan the Terrible through Peter the Great and Alexander I to Nicholas II.

Paradoxical as it may now seem, Stalin set the pattern for the development of national as contrasted with international communism. Tito now castigates Stalin not for Russia's internal system (Yugoslavia, too, is a police state, and at its own pace is trying to carry out a program of agricultural collectivization and industrialization in essence not dissimilar from the Russian pattern), but for Moscow's attempt to dominate the "building of socialism" in Yugoslavia according to the "one country" concept. According to Belgrade's ideologists, who went back to Lenin's theories, a Communist state, even though it be a great power, must behave differently from other great powers and must not attempt to dominate, exploit or influence weaker nations (at least not those ruled by Communist regimes). In short, it must refrain from acts which, when committed by "capitalist" Western nations, have been denounced by world Communists as "imperialist." The real basis of Tito's condemnation of Stalin is not that he practices communism, but that he tries to make Communist movements outside Russia serve the U.S.S.R.'s interests.

This verdict should not surprise the Russian Communists. Stalin himself, as early as the 1920's, repeatedly indicated his contempt for the effectiveness of Communist movements in other countries and held the Comintern—promoted by Lenin and Trotzky—in low esteem. Available evidence indicates that even during the war, as Isaac Deutscher points out in his book, *Stalin*, the Soviet dictator "had no doubt that Russia's armed strength, and not the revolutionary forces abroad, would be the decisive factor" in assuring ultimate victory.

Stalin's Prediction

Yet Stalin in 1925 foresaw that any attempt by Russia to revive its pre-1917 imperialist policy of claiming special rights and privileges in other countries and establishing spheres of influence like other great powers would spell the doom of international communism. At that time, answering some Soviet spokesmen who had deplored Lenin's haste in repudiating "imperialism" on Russia's behalf and had advocated the country's return to an imperialist foreign policy, Stalin said: "This would be the road to nationalism and degeneration, the road of the full liquidation of the international policy of the proletariat. People possessed of this disease see our country not as part of a whole, which

is called the world revolutionary movement, but as the beginning and the end of that movement, thinking that the interests of all other countries should be sacrificed to the interests of our country." Presumably Marshal Tito would say amen to Stalin's sentiments of a quarter of a century ago. Although this is what President Roosevelt would have called an "iffy" question, it is interesting to speculate as to the course Moscow might have followed had not two great neighboring powers, Germany and Japan, both of which in Tsarist times clashed with Russia and threatened its security, set out in the 1930's to carve spheres of influence for themselves in Europe and Asia.

Will Communism Gain or Lose?

If the transformation of international communism into national communism should continue, this will unquestionably weaken the position of Russia as a national state. Will it weaken communism? And will it strengthen the democratic segment of the world? By still another paradox, the most powerful challenge to Russian communism has come not from democracy in either its free private enterprise or socialist form, but from other Communist movements. It is entirely conceivable that by dissociating themselves from the U.S.S.R., Communists in other countries will gain, not lose, and will succeed in consolidating Communist systems adapted to the peculiar conditions of each given country where they have gained power, as has happened in Yugoslavia. One of the strongest indictments of Communist parties outside Russia has been their link with and their sympathy for the U.S.S.R. If this link is severed, or at least weakened, it is possible that many workers and intellectuals who, for example in France, are repelled by Communist ties with Russia but find no fulfillment of their political and economic aspirations in the ranks of any other existing party, may turn to a renovated national communism.

This potential development poses far-reaching problems for the United States as the spokesman of Western democracy. By capitalizing on Tito's defiance of Stalin this country has taken the risk of giving limited aid to communism. Over

the long run such aid may consolidate Communist regimes where they now exist and possibly encourage their rise elsewhere. Nor is it possible for us to count on unquestioning totalitarian adherence by anti-Stalin Communist regimes to the policy of the United States.

This has already been made clear by Belgrade's decision to recognize the Chinese Communist regime. As Hamilton Fish Armstrong states in the October *Atlantic Monthly*, "the opponents of our opponents are not automatically our friends." At Yalta in all sincerity (but perhaps with considerable naivete), American negotiators insisted that the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans which, for wartime purposes, had been acknowledged by Britain and the United States to be in Russia's sphere of influence, should hold "free unfettered elections" after the war. Yet we have accommodated ourselves with equanimity to non-democratic political institutions not only in countries we classify among our friends, notably Portugal, Turkey and the Arab nations—not to speak of some of our Latin American neighbors—but now also in the case of Yugoslavia. Has our quarrel since 1945 been fundamentally with Communist totalitarianism—or with the Russian national state and with other Communist-ruled nations to the extent that they gave aid and comfort to Russia?

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of three articles on socialism, communism and the future of democracy in Europe.)

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

*BUFFALO, November 5, *U.S.A.-U.S.S.R.: Today's Super-Powers*, Vera Micheles Dean

ALBANY, November 15, *Student Institute*, W. L. Godshall

*ALBANY, November 15, *United States Policy in the Far East*, W. L. Godshall, Lyman Hoover

*CLEVELAND, November 16, *China Today*, His Excellency V. K. Wellington Koo

*Data taken from printed announcement

News in the Making

GERMAN INDUSTRY: Membership of the West German state in the Council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation will sharpen the drive against dismantling of German factories. Bonn government leaders are expected to press a substitute program whereby reparations would come from current production and industry would be supervised by an international trusteeship system. Any change, however, will need the approval of Britain, France and the United States.

BRITISH ECONOMIES: Prime Minister Clement Attlee's \$784 million cut in government spending appears to be only the first step in Labor's post-devaluation program. Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Stafford Cripps hinted in the House of Commons on October 26 that Britain would curtail credits to other countries and would slow down repayment of the sterling balances, which represent British war debts to such nations as India, Pakistan and Egypt.

MEDITERRANEAN DEFENSE: Concurrently with the Arab League's decision to formulate a collective security pact, steps were being taken at the Western end of the Mediterranean to strengthen the Iberian alliance between Spain and Portugal. On October 22 Generalissimo Franco paid his first foreign visit of state to the Portuguese Premier, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. These moves, taken in connection with the visit of King Abdullah of Jordan to Spain in September and Portugal's ratification of the North Atlantic treaty on July 27, represent a tentative attempt to link Mediterranean countries up with the Western defense system.

BELGIUM'S ROYAL QUESTION: Prospects for a decision on the much-agitated question of whether Belgium should invite King Leopold III, now living as an exile in Switzerland, to return to the throne improved when the Senate on October 27 approved a bill to hold a national referendum on this issue. The bill is expected to pass the Chamber early this month, and the referendum would then be held in December.